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QUESTION PRESENTED 
 
 Amicus curiae will address the following ques-
tion: 
 
Whether the Utah Supreme Court misapplied 
deterrence theory in its approach to reviewing 
the $145 million punitive damage award in this 
case. 
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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1 
 
Keith N. Hylton is Professor of Law at Boston 
University, where he teaches torts and antitrust, 
among other subjects.  He is also Chair of the Section 
on Torts and Compensation Systems of the American 
Association of Law Schools, and Editor of the Social 
Science Research Network’s Torts, Product Liability, 
and Insurance Law Abstracts journal.  Professor     
Hylton has a Ph.D. in Economics from MIT, and a J.D. 
from Harvard University.  Before moving to Boston 
University in 1995, Professor Hylton taught at North-
western University Law School, where he began his 
teaching career in 1989.  Professor Hylton has written 
more than forty articles in American law journals and 
peer-reviewed law and economics journals, many of 
them on the subject of tort liability.  He currently 
serves as a member of the American Law Institute, on 
the Executive Board of the Antitrust Law Section of 
the American Association of Law Schools, and has 
served as a Director of the American Law and Eco-
nomics Association.  His textbook, Antitrust Law: Eco-
nomic Theory and Common Law Evolution, is sched-
uled to be published by Cambridge University Press in 
November 2002. 
Professors A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven 
Shavell have filed an amicus brief in support of peti-
tioner State Farm.  The Polinsky and Shavell brief 
draws heavily on the argument in their article Punitive 
Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 
869 (1998).  Professor Hylton responded to their arti-
cle with an alternative theory of punitive damages in 
Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penal-
ties, 87 Geo. L.J. 421 (1998).  Professor Hylton has 
                                                 
1 The parties have filed blanket written consents with the 
Clerk to the filing of amicus briefs in this case.  This brief was not 
authored in whole or in part by counsel for a party, and no person 
or entity, other than amicus and his counsel made a monetary 
contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. 
 2 
filed this brief in order to provide the Court with a 
more complete view of the insights from law and eco-
nomics work on punitive damages. 
 
INTRODUCTION AND 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Virtually all courts accept the view that high 
punitive damage awards are appropriate in instances 
where the defendant’s harmful conduct is unlikely to 
lead to liability.  See, e.g., BMW of N. Am. Inc. v. Gore, 
517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996).  The Utah Supreme Court 
reinstated the $145 million punitive damage award in 
this case in part on the ground that “State Farm’s ac-
tions, because of their clandestine nature, will be pun-
ished at most in one out of every 50,000 cases as a 
matter of statistical probability.”  Pet App. 30a.  A  
central   issue of this case is whether the Utah Su-
preme Court acted irrationally by misapplying deter-
rence theory in its review of the $145 million punitive 
damage award against State Farm. 
Amicus contends that the Utah Supreme Court 
acted rationally and that its review of the $145 million 
award was consistent with basic deterrence principles.  
The theory of deterrence provides suitable guidelines 
for assessing the rationality and reasonableness of a 
punitive damage award.  Deterrence theory, when cor-
rectly applied to the Utah Supreme Court’s decision, 
does not suggest that the punitive damage award in 
this case should be reduced.  Indeed, the $145 million 
punitive damage award is demonstrably within the 
range of reasonable awards suggested by the theory of 
deterrence applied to the facts of this case. 
The theory of deterrence suggests two broad 
approaches to punishment: internalization and gain 
elimination.  Under the internalization approach, the 
goal of the punishing authority is to shift all of the 
costs imposed on society by the offender’s conduct 
back to the offender — i.e., to force the offender to pay 
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the full “social” costs of his harmful conduct.  Inter-
nalization is accomplished by ensuring that the     
penalty imposed on the offender is equal to the total 
harm to society caused by his conduct.  In some 
cases, the simplest way to do this is to divide the    
victim’s harm by the probability of liability. 
Under the gain-elimination approach, the goal 
of the punishing authority is to eliminate the expecta-
tion of gain from the offender’s harmful conduct.  Gain 
elimination is accomplished by ensuring that the    
penalty imposed on the offender is at least as great as 
the offender’s realized or expected gain.  In some 
cases, the simplest way to do this is to divide the of-
fender’s gain (or expected gain) by the probability of 
liability, and take the result as an estimate of the 
minimum gain-stripping penalty.  The actual penalty 
imposed on the offender should be at least as large as 
this minimum gain-stripping level. 
The most basic lesson from deterrence theory 
concerns when it is appropriate to use the internaliza-
tion approach rather than the gain-elimination       
approach.  The answer is simple: gain elimination is 
the preferable approach whenever (a) the offender has 
attempted to bypass the market by using force or 
fraud to take something from the victim, or (b) the   
offender’s gain cannot plausibly be as great as the   
victim’s loss.  The first case applies to acts of theft and 
fraud.  The second case applies to reckless conduct, 
such as speeding in a car through an area crowded 
with pedestrians. 
In light of this basic lesson, the gain-
elimination approach clearly applies to this case, 
which involves a corporate policy of fraudulent con-
duct toward consumers by State Farm.  Hence, there 
is simply no basis in deterrence theory for believing 
that the $145 million award is excessive merely be-
cause the court relied on the low probability of liability 
associated with the overall pattern of misconduct cre-
ated by the fraudulent policy. 
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However, there is a basis in deterrence theory 
for limiting punitive damage awards, and for contest-
ing the $145 million award in this case, even when the 
aim of the award is, as in this case, to strip offender 
gains.  If there is substantial uncertainty as to 
whether the defendant’s conduct really merits the 
gain-stripping penalty (e.g., whether the defendant’s 
conduct really belongs in the same category as theft 
and fraud), then a reviewing court should try to       
determine whether the punitive award exceeds the 
plausible range of a minimum gain-stripping penalty.  
If the award exceeds the plausible range of such a 
penalty, the reviewing court should reduce the award 
to the minimum gain-stripping level.  The reason is to 
avoid imposing penalties that discourage socially    
benign or beneficial conduct. 
Applying this rationale for limiting punitive 
damage awards to the case, there is still no basis for 
reducing the punitive damage award against State 
Farm.  The $145 million award in this case appears to 
be well within the range of a plausible minimum gain-
stripping award and State Farm has provided no     
evidence to suggest otherwise.  Given this, a reviewing 
court should uphold the award as reasonable. 
 
ARGUMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court relied on deterrence-
based arguments in upholding the $145 million puni-
tive damage award in this case.  Amicus will apply the 
theory of deterrence to evaluate the reasonableness 
and rationality of the Utah Supreme Court’s decision.  
Amicus will begin with a summary of deterrence the-
ory and its implications for punitive damage awards.  
The second part of the analysis will explore the the-
ory’s implications for the limits of punitive damage 
awards and the reasonableness of the award in this 
case.  Amicus concludes that the theory does provide 
limits on the size of punitive damage awards and that 
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the $145 million award in this case is well within the 
range of a reasonable punitive damage award. 
 
I. DETERRENCE THEORY PROVIDES USEFUL 
GUIDELINES FOR REVIEWING PUNITIVE 
DAMAGE AWARDS 
 
A. The Theory of Penalties Provides the 
Foundation for Deterrence Theory 
Punitive damages are designed to punish 
wrongdoers rather than compensate victims.  The rea-
son for punishing bad actors is to deter them from   
engaging in socially harmful conduct in the future.  
Given the importance of deterrence for the desired 
function of punitive damages, the proper approach to 
understanding deterrence theory in the context of   
punitive damages is to start with an examination of 
the theory of penalties. 
 The theory of penalties aims to discover “opti-
mal” levels of penalties.  An optimal penalty avoids two 
significant types of cost: underdeterrence and overde-
terrence.  Underdeterrence results when penalties are 
so low that they fail to deter actors from engaging in 
conduct that is socially harmful.  Overdeterrence    
results when penalties are so high that they force    
potential injurers or offenders to take precautions that 
are on balance socially harmful, or to forgo engaging 
in socially desirable activities.  For example, if the fear 
of tort damages (a type of penalty) for medical mal-
practice induces hospitals to close their emergency 
wards, one might view this as an example of a penalty 
having substantial overdeterrence costs. 
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The theory of penalties began with early treat-
ments by Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham.2  
Beccaria argued that penalties should be set to elimi-
nate the offender’s gain.3  This gain-stripping level 
should be viewed as the optimal level, Beccaria sug-
gested, for two reasons.  First, the gain-stripping pen-
alty deterred harmful conduct.  Second, any penalty 
set higher than the gain-stripping level risked encour-
aging more socially undesirable conduct by potential 
offenders.  Beccaria believed that excessive and harsh 
penalties encouraged excessively harsh conduct from 
potential offenders.  This may have been a reasonable 
assumption in his time, when torture was a common 
form of punishment and little effort was devoted to   
rehabilitating offenders. 
 Bentham, like Beccaria, argued that penalties 
should eliminate the offender’s prospect of gain.4     
Although Bentham’s utilitarian theories were far more 
wide-reaching than Beccaria’s, on the particular sub-
ject matter of penalties Bentham’s contributions were 
largely of a technical nature, though still important.  
Bentham stressed the role of marginal deterrence in 
the design of penalties and the need to increase penal-
ties to offset any dilution in deterrence that results 
because the probability of punishment is low.5      
Bentham’s concern for marginal deterrence — i.e., for 
deterring offenders from choosing the most harmful 
option — led him to recommend that penalties should 
be set sufficiently close to the gain-stripping level to 
avoid encouraging an offender to step up to the most 
harmful level of conduct.6  For example, if the penalty 
for battery and murder were the same, an offender 
                                                 
2 CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Henry 
Paolucci ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1963)(1764); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Prome-
theus Books 1998)(1781). 
3 BECCARIA, supra note 2, at 43-44. 
4 BENTHAM, supra note 2, at 179. 
5 Id. at 181-84. 
6 Id. at 181. 
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who had planned to commit battery would have an  
incentive to murder rather than stop at the commis-
sion of the battery. 
 The theory of penalties remained at this stage 
until Gary S. Becker’s contribution in 1968.7  Becker 
argued that penalties should aim to internalize or to 
shift society’s losses back to offenders — a policy 
which will be referred to below as the “internalization” 
goal.  Most important, Becker set out an economic 
framework that generates the internalization goal, and 
also shows conditions under which gain-stripping 
would be the optimal policy.  On the broader level of 
utilitarian theory, Becker suggested a radical neutral-
ity or indifference toward individual preferences.8  
Gains that result from theft, under Becker’s frame-
work, are indistinguishable from gains that result 
from hard work and study.  There is no a priori reason 
under Becker’s framework for discounting the prefer-
ences of bad actors. 
 Becker’s neutrality toward preferences has    
become a fundamental building block of the modern 
law and economics approach.  However, some schol-
ars have become so invested in this approach that 
they are reluctant to approve of any legal tests that 
allocate damages on the basis of the intent or the 
mental state of the offender.9  In the place of mental 
state-based tests, i.e., tests that distinguish between 
offenders who acted innocently and offenders who 
acted maliciously, some scholars have advanced tests 
that focus exclusively on objective factors such as the 
                                                 
7 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic   
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
8 Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic 
Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO.L.J. 421, 427-28 (1998).  
9 See Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 
74 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 660 & 680 n.85 (2001) (discussing ten-
dency in law and economics literature to de-emphasize or ignore 
mental state-based tests in the law, with example from torts litera-
ture). 
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probability of liability.10  Amicus hopes to make clear 
that this is not at all required by the theory of penal-
ties or deterrence theory.  The economic theory of 
penalties, which provides the foundation for the eco-
nomic theory of damages, implies that damages 
should depend on a characterization of the offender’s 
conduct, which will in turn depend in many instances 
on a characterization of the offender’s intent.  The 
probability of liability is an important factor, but its 
degree of importance is heavily dependent on the    
appropriate characterization of the offender’s conduct. 
 Under Becker’s framework, the optimal deter-
rence policy depends on the relationship between the 
offender’s gain and society’s harm.  If the offender’s 
gain is always less than society’s harm, then the opti-
mal policy is to strip the offender of his expectation of 
gain (gain-stripping penalty).  If some offenders enjoy 
a gain that exceeds society’s loss, then the optimal 
policy is to internalize the loss to the offender (inter-
nalizing penalty).  It happens that the internalizing 
penalty always performs optimally as a deterrent    
under this framework, and for this reason Becker 
urged a general policy of internalization.11 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive 
Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 910 
(1998) (proposing that courts should disregard evidence on repre-
hensibility and determine punitive damages by dividing the com-
pensatory damage award by the probability of liability).  Cf. TXO 
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 469 (1993) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“it was rational for the jury to place 
great weight on the evidence of TXO’s deliberate, wrongful conduct 
in determining that a substantial award was required in order to 
serve the goals of punishment and deterrence.”). 
11 To understand Becker’s framework, consider an exam-
ple involving intentional harms.  Suppose victims own cars worth 
$1000 and offenders are car thieves.  For simplicity, assume that 
each thief will be caught by law enforcers, and that the enforce-
ment cost is zero.  (If the enforcement cost is positive, then one 
should add the cost of enforcement to the social losses imposed by 
the offensive conduct.) 
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 Of course, it should be kept in mind that the 
main reason Becker recommends the internalizing 
penalty across the board is because of its administra-
tive ease.  The internalizing penalty is administratively 
easy to apply because it does not require the enforce-
ment authority to determine whether the offender’s 
gain is less than society’s loss.  The administrative 
ease argument does not alter the underlying purpose 
of the penalty in the case in which offender gains are 
less than social losses.  The underlying purpose in 
that case is always to completely deter offensive con-
duct by ensuring that no offender gains as a result of 
his bad conduct. 
                                                                                                    
Case 1 (Low-valuing thieves): Assume first that each thief 
values a car at $500.  Each theft therefore produces a gain of $500 
to the thief.  The theft also produces a loss of $1000 to the victim.  
The net social gain from a theft, then, is the difference between the 
thief’s gain and society’s loss, which is $500 minus $1000, or -
$500.  Equivalently, theft produces a net social loss of $500.  
(While it may seem strange to refer to a theft as producing a 
“gain,” one must keep in mind that the Becker framework makes 
no distinction between the gains of thieves and the gains of ordi-
nary people.)  Since theft produces no social gain in this case, the 
optimal penalty seeks to prevent theft from occurring altogether.  
This is accomplished by a gain-stripping penalty set at a level of at 
least $500.  Alternatively, one could choose a penalty equal to 
$1000 or $1 million.  Any penalty sufficient to strip the offender’s 
gains is desirable as a deterrent in this case. 
Case 2 (Some high-valuing thieves): Now assume half the 
thieves value a car at $2000 while the other half value the car at 
$500.   If a high-valuing thief steals a car, the net gain to society is 
$2000 minus $1000 = $1000.  In this case full deterrence is not 
desirable because there is a positive net social gain when a high-
valuing thief steals a car.  In other words, there are overdeterrence 
costs when the penalty is set at a level that fully deters theft.  The 
optimal fine under the Becker approach aims to internalize soci-
ety’s loss, which is set at the level $1000.  This penalty completely 
deters theft by low-valuing offenders, and allows theft by high-
valuing offenders.  More generally, in the presence of uncertainty 
about the size of offender gains, the internalizing penalty generates 
the optimal level of deterrence by allowing thefts to occur when-
ever the offender gains more than society loses, and otherwise de-
terring theft. 
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 The next important contribution to this theory 
was Richard Posner’s An Economic Theory of Criminal 
Law.12  The key contribution of Posner was to intro-
duce the role of the market in the design of penalties 
for deterrence purposes.  Posner suggested that penal-
ties should be set at the gain-stripping level whenever 
the offender had the option, at low cost, of entering 
into a consensual transaction for whatever good or  
entitlement he sought from the victim.  Gain stripping 
makes sense whenever a consensual transaction is 
available as an alternative because potential offenders 
should be encouraged, in most cases, to use the mar-
ket rather than take things from victims.13  In particu-
lar, if the transaction cost of using the market is lower 
than the cost of enforcing the law against an offender, 
then society’s costs are held to the lowest level by forc-
ing potential offenders into the market whenever con-
                                                 
12 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, 
85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (1985). 
13 If we apply Posner’s suggested approach to the car theft 
example in note 11, then the optimal penalty would aim to strip 
the gains of car thieves, whether they valued cars highly ($2000) 
or lowly ($500).  Gain elimination is the right goal because the car 
thief has the option, at a presumably small cost, of approaching 
his intended victim and trying to arrange a consensual transac-
tion.  Thus, if the thief values the car at $2000, the penalty should 
be set no less than $2000; and for the low-valuing thief the pen-
alty should be no less than $500.  Administrative expenses would 
be minimized by setting the penalty at $2001.  There is no need to 
worry about overdeterrence because the penalty of $2001 does not 
prohibit any particular transfer; it merely forces each potential 
thief to arrange a consensual transfer in the market.  The one case 
in which “market forcing” may not be the best policy is when 
transaction costs are very high — or alternatively, the market is 
not a ready alternative to simply taking an item.  For this reason, 
the framework suggests that internalization is the right policy 
when a consensual transaction is difficult to arrange, as in the 
case of a person, lost in the woods, who breaks into a cottage to 
steal food.  The necessity doctrine of criminal and tort law embod-
ies this exception. 
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sensual transactions are a relatively inexpensive 
means of transferring entitlements.14 
 To sum up, the theory of penalties gives us 
three general sets of conditions with implied penalty 
levels.  (1) The first general set of conditions is where 
transaction costs are high (market not available) and 
some offender gains exceed society’s losses.  In this 
case, the optimal penalty aims to internalize society’s 
losses. (2) The second general set of conditions is 
where transaction costs are high (market not avail-
able) and each offender’s gain is less than society’s 
loss.  In this case, the optimal penalty aims to com-
pletely deter by stripping or eliminating the offender’s 
expectation of gain. (3) The third general set of condi-
tions is where transaction costs are low — in other 
words, the offender can easily enter into a consensual 
transaction with his intended victim.  In this case, the 
optimal penalty aims to completely deter, to force    
actors into the market, by stripping the offender’s   
expectation of gain. 
One could just as easily reach this conclusion 
by carefully considering the costs of excessive penal-
ties and the costs of inadequate penalties.15  Whenever 
an honest transaction in the market is available as an 
alternative to simply taking something by force or 
fraud, penalties should be set so as to strongly        
                                                 
14 See Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Penalties and the 
Economics of Criminal Law, Boston University Law School Working 
Paper (2002), available at <http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/    
papers>. 
15 See Hylton, supra note 8.  An alternative approach 
which supports the same conclusion is found in the literature that 
stresses the “secondary costs” (e.g., costs of avoidance and self-
protective efforts) generated by intentional misconduct.  See Fred 
S. McChesney, Boxed In: Economists and the Benefits from Crime, 
13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 225 (1993); Richard L. Hasen & Richard H. 
McAdams, The Surprisingly Complex Case Against Theft, 17 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 367 (1997).  For an application of the secondary-
costs theory to punitive damages, see David D. Haddock, Fred S. 
McChesney, & Menahem Spiegel, An Ordinary Economic Rationale 
for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1990). 
 12 
encourage honest market transactions.16  Setting the 
penalty higher than necessary to accomplish this pur-
pose is not socially costly unless there is substantial 
uncertainty over how to characterize the offender’s 
conduct. 
 
B. The Theory of Penalties Implies that 
Punitive Damage Awards Should Aim 
to Make the Injurer Pay the Full Costs 
of the Harm It Imposes in Some Cases, 
and in Other Cases the Punitive Dam-
age Award Should Aim to Make the In-
jurer Disgorge Any Gains It Receives 
as a Result of Its Harmful Conduct 
The theory of penalties provides a foundation 
for the theory of tort damages.  It has become com-
monplace now to think of tort damages as serving an 
internalizing function under the theory of deterrence.  
However, the framework explained above, which dis-
tinguishes between cases in which market transac-
tions are cheap and in which offender gains exceed 
social losses, provides the best foundation for under-
standing damage awards.  The framework implies pre-
cisely when punitive damage awards should be added 
to compensatory awards, as well as the aim of the   
punitive damage award. 
                                                 
16 The framework presented here is consistent with that of 
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. 
REV. 1089 (1972).  The famous Calabresi-Melamed framework 
holds that property rules, which prevent violations and strip gains, 
are appropriate whenever transaction costs are low; and liability 
rules, which internalize costs, are appropriate when transaction 
costs are high.  The framework described in the text is somewhat 
more complicated and incorporates the Calabresi-Melamed analy-
sis.  The connection between these approaches reveals that one 
function of punitive damages is to maintain the distinction       
between property rules and liability rules — or, equivalently, to 
prevent property rules from being converted into liability rules. 
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 The internalization approach has become the 
common approach among tort theorists who are con-
cerned about deterrence.  However, the reason for this 
is that tort theorists are often trying to explain why 
compensatory damages should be required, and the 
level at which such damages should be set.  If,        
instead, we ask what the level of damages should be, 
we begin to see that internalization is an approach 
that is appropriate in general in the torts context, but 
that there also exceptions in which internalization is 
not the best policy. 
 Consider the case offered in the Polinsky and 
Shavell amicus brief of 
a manufacturing plant that generates an 
emission that damages the finishes of 
automobiles in the vicinity of the plant.  
Damage to the automobiles is, say, 
$100,000, while a filter that would cost 
only $50,000 to install would completely 
prevent this damage.  Because the 
manufacturer would rather pay $50,000 
than $100,000, holding it liable for dam-
ages equal to the harm it causes will  
motivate it to install the filter.  This is 
the socially desirable outcome.17 
This example shows that internalizing the     
victim’s loss of $100,000 through tort damages pro-
vides optimal incentives by inducing the plant owner 
to install the $50,000 filter.  However, if we view this 
as a problem of designing the right penalty, this is not 
the only solution.  The state could impose a fine of 
$50,001 on the plant owner.  Facing a penalty of 
$50,001, which would strip the plant owner of any 
gains from refusing to install the filter, the plant 
owner would have an incentive to install the filter. 
                                                 
17 Brief Amicus Curiae of A. Mitchell Polinsky, Steven 
Shavell, and the Citizens for a Sound Economy Foundation in 
Support of Petitioner (“Polinsky and Shavell Br.”) at 7. 
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 The manufacturing plant example forces us to 
ask why society should prefer, on deterrence grounds, 
to set damages at $100,000 (the internalizing or com-
pensatory level) rather than at $50,001 (the minimum 
gain-stripping level).  The answer is that in the pres-
ence of uncertainty over the cost of a filter and other 
options available to the plant owner, setting damages 
at the internalizing level generates the optimal level of 
deterrence.  If some plant owners would have to pay 
$200,000 for a filter, then setting a penalty at the 
gain-stripping level ($200,001) would overdeter by   
inducing them to invest $200,000 to avoid a property 
loss of $100,000. 
 On the other hand, suppose no uncertainty   
existed regarding the cost of a filter, and no filter costs 
more than $50,000.  Then there would be no basis on 
deterrence grounds to require the plant owner to pay 
damages of $100,000.  The same level of deterrence 
could be achieved by requiring the plant owner to pay 
damages of $50,001, leaving the car owners to bear 
the remaining $49,999 in losses if the plant owner re-
fuses to install the filter.  These damages would never 
be  realized, of course, because the plant owner would 
choose to install the filter. 
 The point of this example is to show that the 
deterrence goal requires us to set damages in order to 
internalize losses in some cases, and in other cases it 
requires us to set damages in order to strip gains.  In 
order to determine whether deterrence theory implies 
a need for internalization as opposed to gain stripping, 
we need to examine the particular circumstances    
giving rise to the victim’s injury.  The three conditions 
identified in the preceding section give us the impor-
tant features of those circumstances in terms of their 
implications for deterrence. 
 This argument’s implications for punitive dam-
ages should be clear.  Punitive damages are additions 
to compensatory damages that are designed to punish 
the offender in instances where such punishment is 
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socially desirable.  The conditions identified in the 
previous section imply the following rules: 
Punitive Rule 1: Whenever the offender has 
evaded the market by forcefully or fraudulently effect-
ing a transfer of some entitlement from the victim to 
himself or to a third party, the offender should be 
forced to pay damages that, at a minimum, strip it of 
all expectation of gain. 
Punitive Rule 2: Whenever the offender’s gain is 
highly likely to be less than the victim’s (or victims’) 
loss, the offender should be forced to pay damages 
that, at a minimum, strip it of all expectation of gain. 
The first punitive damage rule applies to all 
forms of conduct that fall under the general category 
of “market bypassing.”  Theft carried out by force or by 
fraud are classic examples.  With respect to all such 
conduct, the appropriate aim of the court in evaluat-
ing a punitive damage award is to completely deter or 
eradicate the conduct by eliminating any prospect of 
gain on the part of the defendant. 
The second punitive damage rule applies to 
conduct in which the gain to the offender is obviously 
less than the loss imposed on others.  The classic case 
here is reckless conduct: for example, driving at a high 
speed through an area crowded with pedestrians.  On 
the assumption that the offender does not have a    
necessity-based defense (e.g., that he had to speed in 
order to save another life), and that he is not directly 
aiming to run someone over (which would change the 
example to intentional murder), this is a case in which 
the risks imposed on others cannot be justified by the 
gain to the actor.  Another example is allowing a 
young child to drive a car in an area with pedestrians 
or other cars, or to play with a gun in such an area.  
Again, in this case, it is highly unlikely that the       
offender’s gain could justify the risk of loss imposed 
on others.  In these cases, the actor’s conduct should 
be completely deterred.  It follows that a punitive 
damage award should aim, at a minimum, to remove 
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any prospect of gain from the injurer, and it may often 
be appropriate to set the award considerably higher in 
order to discourage other potential offenders. 
 It remains to be explained where the internali-
zation approach recently urged by Polinsky and   
Shavell fits within this framework.18  Polinsky and 
Shavell have argued that punitive damages should be 
determined by dividing the actual loss by the probabil-
ity of liability.19  By dividing the compensatory portion 
by the probability of liability, the total award effec-
tively makes the offender pay for all of the costs it im-
poses on society — because each award forces the   
offender to pay for those cases in which it “gets away” 
without being held liable for its conduct.  The punitive 
portion of the award, under this algorithm, is simply 
the difference between this measure and the compen-
satory measure.  In a regime in which liability is     
uncertain, the Polinsky and Shavell algorithm guaran-
tees full internalization of victim losses. 
 It should be clear from the foregoing that the 
internalization rule urged by Polinsky and Shavell 
should be followed when the offender has not evaded 
the market (i.e., a market transaction is difficult to  
arrange, as in most accident settings) and the         
offender’s gain is likely to be greater than society’s 
loss.  Most run-of-the-mill torts involving accidental or 
non-intentional injuries fall within this category.  For 
example, the competent operation of a railroad is an 
activity in which the operator’s gain (as well as the 
gain to customers) is likely to exceed losses due to   
accidents.  Moreover, a pre-accident market transac-
tion in which the railroad and the victim agree on an 
allocation of the accident risk is infeasible.  Internali-
zation is the proper goal in this context, since society 
has no interest in completely deterring the competent 
provision of rail service.  Given that internalization is 
the appropriate goal under deterrence theory, damage 
                                                 
18 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 10. 
19 Id. at 874-75. 
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awards involving accidental injuries should never    
exceed the actual loss divided by the probability of  
liability.20 
 A more straightforward example in which the 
Polinsky and Shavell approach is properly applicable 
is the case in which an employee of a firm steals from 
a customer, against the firm’s policies and interests, 
while acting within the scope of employment.  Con-
sider, for example, an insurance agent who steals cus-
tomers’ premium payments rather than remitting 
them to the insurer, as in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance 
Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).  Since the employee 
has committed a theft, any damage award against the 
employee alone should aim, at a minimum, to strip 
the employee’s gain.  The damage award against the 
employer, however, should be limited by the internali-
zation principle.  The reason is that the employer itself 
has not adopted a policy of theft, and indeed the     
employer itself suffers a loss in this case.  In order to 
provide the right incentives for the employer to moni-
tor its employees (or, in some cases, agents) it may be 
necessary to divide the customer’s actual loss by the 
probability of liability. 
 
                                                 
20 As it happens, courts typically award compensatory 
damages, without any upward adjustment based on the probabil-
ity of liability.  Even though courts do not typically inflate damages 
by dividing by the probability of liability, this does not imply that 
ordinary tort law fails to appropriately deter harmful conduct.  For 
a careful explanation, see Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Dam-
ages: The Multiplier Principle, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2185 (1999).       
Indeed, since ordinary negligence rules do not seem to be insuffi-
cient to deter harmful conduct, inflating damages by dividing the 
compensatory award by the probability of liability (in routine cases 
of negligence) could easily result in socially excessive deterrence.  
See Mark F. Grady, Efficient Negligence, 87 GEO. L.J. 397 (1998).  
In view of this, the Polinsky and Shavell algorithm should be    
understood as providing an upper limit on damages in which liabil-
ity is based on negligence or some strict liability doctrine (e.g., nui-
sance). 
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C. In Cases in Which Punitive Damage 
Awards Should be Designed to Strip 
the Injurer of Its Gains, the Primary 
Concern Should be to Avoid Setting an 
Award that is Less Than the Minimum 
Necessary to Disgorge Those Gains 
In cases where it is appropriate under deter-
rence theory to eliminate the injurer’s gain, the       
primary concern of the penalty designer should be to 
make sure that the penalty is not so low that it fails to 
deter harmful conduct.  Overdeterrence is not a con-
cern because the reason for gain stripping is to totally 
deter or eradicate the injurer’s conduct, not to con-
strain it to some “optimal” level.  In this part, amicus 
shows the implications of this argument for the proper 
consideration of the likelihood of liability in the design 
of an optimal penalty. 
As a general rule, the probability of liability 
plays the same role in the design of a gain-stripping 
damage award that it plays in the design of an inter-
nalizing damage award.  According to Polinsky and 
Shavell, a court should divide the damage award by 
the probability of liability in order to internalize the 
full amount.21  In the gain-stripping case, the same 
rule applies.  In order to ensure that offender gains 
will be stripped, the award must be no less than the 
offender’s gain divided by the probability of liability. 
However, deterrence theory implies that the 
probability of liability has only a secondary level of 
importance in the determination of a gain-stripping 
punitive damage award.  When the offender’s conduct 
is “market bypassing” (Punitive Rule 1), the proper 
goal of deterrence is to completely deter the  offender’s 
conduct.  Given the goal of complete eradication or de-
terrence, there is no reason on deterrence grounds to 
worry about costs due to excessive deterrence.  This 
implies that a mistake in the direction of assuming an 
                                                 
21 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 10. 
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inaccurately low probability of liability is unlikely to 
generate significant overdeterrence costs, provided 
that the offender’s conduct definitely belongs in the 
market-bypassing category.  The same goes for the 
case in which the offender’s conduct definitely   be-
longs in the gain-less-than-loss category (Punitive 
Rule 2). 
The key difference between gain stripping and 
internalization as goals of the punitive damage award 
lies in their implications for overdeterrence costs.  In 
the case in which internalization is the proper goal, 
the court must divide by an accurate measure of the 
probability of liability in order to avoid generating 
overdeterrence or underdetterence costs.  In the case 
in which gain-stripping is the proper goal of the dam-
age award, the most important goal in estimating the 
probability of liability is to avoid choosing an inaccu-
rately large estimate of the probability of liability.  
Since underdeterrence is a far more important con-
cern than overdeterrence in this case, courts should 
aim primarily to avoid making a mistake in the direc-
tion of setting the penalty below the minimum neces-
sary to strip the gain generated by the offender’s con-
duct.22 
The following example allows one to apply these 
lessons to the case of an offender who engages in a 
multi-part scheme of misconduct.  Suppose the       
offender engages in two types of intentional harmful 
conduct with different probabilities of liability con-
                                                 
22 Note that this greatly eases the administrative burden of 
trying to take the probability of liability into account in determin-
ing a multiplier for a punitive award.  In most cases it is almost 
impossible to get an accurate estimate of the probability of liabil-
ity.  The gain-stripping approach, which stresses avoidance of  
underdeterrence, is considerably easier to apply than the inter-
nalization approach because it only requires the court to find a 
lower bound on the range of plausible estimates of the probability 
of liability.  The internalization approach of Polinsky and Shavell 
requires the court to find an exact estimate of the probability of 
liability. 
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nected to them.  To take a simple case, assume the 
offender steals cars in the middle of the night, and 
also steals credit cards, doing both with equal fre-
quency.  The offender’s gain from stealing cars is 
$2000 per car and from stealing credit cards is $5000 
per card.  Suppose the likelihood of being caught is 
1/10 for car theft, and 1/2 for credit-card theft.  The 
minimum gain-stripping penalty for car theft is 
$20,000 ($2000 divided by 10), and $10,000 ($5000 
divided by 1/2) for credit card theft.  In other words, 
the minimum gain-stripping multiplier is 10 for car 
theft and 2 for credit-card theft (and these multipliers 
are applied to the offender’s gain in each case). 
Now suppose the court uses the lowest prob-
ability of liability in order to calculate the multiplier.  
In this case, the court would apply the minimum car-
theft multiplier of 10 in every case involving the       
defendants who took part in the car and credit card 
theft scheme.  Does this result in substantial overde-
terrence costs?  No.  The defendant’s theft operation 
yields no social benefits whatsoever.  It should be 
completely deterred.  Alternatively, the court could 
impose the average of the two gain-stripping awards 
($10,000 and $20,000) in all cases, resulting in the 
imposition of a damage award of $15,000 in each 
case.  Since this approach strips illicit gains on aver-
age (though just barely), it is equivalent on average to 
the approach that uses the correct offense-specific 
multiplier for each type of misconduct.  The important 
goal for the punishing authority is not to determine 
accurate offense-specific multipliers for each type of 
misconduct.  The important goal is to determine pen-
alty levels that are sufficient to eliminate the offender’s 
illicit gain. 
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources 
Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993), provides a good illustra-
tion of the theory described so far.  Geologists em-
ployed by TXO determined that recovery of oil and gas 
under a roughly 1000 acre tract of land known as the 
 21 
“Blevins Tract” would be profitable.  They recom-
mended that the company acquire the rights to       
develop the oil and gas under the tract.  The owner of 
those rights was Alliance Resources Corporation.  TXO 
made an offer that Alliance considered “phenomenal,” 
which suggests TXO put a higher value on the         
resource than did Alliance (i.e., offender’s gain exceeds 
victim’s loss).  Alliance accepted the offer, assigned its 
interest in the Blevins Tract to TXO, and agreed to  
return the consideration paid to it if TXO determined 
that the title had failed. 
TXO immediately set about on a series of 
fraudulent efforts to show that the title had failed.  
Eventually, TXO sent a letter to Alliance informing it of 
a title objection and suggesting that TXO had acquired 
the oil and gas development rights from another 
source.  TXO filed for a declaratory judgment on the 
conflicting ownership claims.  The jury found in favor 
of Alliance’s counterclaim for slander of title and 
awarded Alliance $19,000 in compensatory damages 
and $10 million in punitive damages. 
The probability-of-liability approach urged by 
Polinsky and Shavell would require the court to divide 
Alliance’s loss, $19,000, by the probability TXO would 
be held liable.  The probability that TXO would be held 
liable is the product of the probability that Alliance 
would file suit and the probability that the court 
would find in favor of Alliance.  Since both probabili-
ties were high, the Polinsky and Shavell approach 
suggests that the optimal punitive damage award in 
TXO would have been zero.  TXO’s damages would 
have been limited to $19,000. 
The framework described here, which follows 
the general implications of deterrence theory, suggests 
that the punitive damage award should have been no 
less than the amount awarded, $10 million.  A $10 
million punitive damage award appears to be quite 
close to the minimum necessary to eliminate the     
expected gain from TXO’s fraudulent conduct.  The 
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figures on amounts invested suggest that TXO could 
have anticipated a profit on the order of $9 million 
from its expropriation of Alliance’s development 
rights.23  Since the probability of liability was high in 
this case, there is no clear need to boost the judgment 
substantially to make up for the risk of non-liability.  
On the other hand, since TXO’s conduct clearly fell 
within the market-bypassing category (Punitive Rule 
1), courts should be far more concerned about under-
deterrence costs than about overdeterrence costs.  The 
punitive damage award of $10 million does not appear 
to be in any way excessive under this approach. 
 
II. THERE IS NO BASIS IN DETERRENCE   
THEORY FOR BELIEVING THAT THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT APPLIED THE THEORY IN 
AN IRRATIONAL MANNER 
In part based on plaintiffs’ evidence that “State 
Farm’s actions, because of their clandestine nature, 
will be punished at most in one out of every 50,000 
cases as a matter of statistical probability,” Pet. App. 
30a, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the $145 million 
punitive damages verdict in this case.  The Polinsky 
and Shavell amicus brief argues that the court’s rea-
soning was flawed because in determining the prob-
ability that State Farm’s actions would escape liability, 
the court failed to focus on the specific 
form of misconduct engaged in by State 
Farm in the present case — the unrea-
sonable rejection of a settlement offer in 
a case against one of its insureds — and 
instead focused on a much more diverse 
                                                 
23 Hylton, supra note 8, at 452.  See also TXO, 509 U.S. at 
447, 450-51 n. 10 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J., joined by 
Rehnquist, C.J., and Blackmun and Kennedy, J.J.) (suggesting 
possible value of the expected gain as high as $8.25 million — i.e., 
respondents’ 22% royalty interest in an expected income stream 
worth up to $37.5 million). 
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range of alleged wrongs, including pur-
ported underpayment of first-party 
claims by State Farm.  Because these 
discrete forms of misconduct involve dif-
ferent likelihoods of generating liability, 
there is no foundation in deterrence   
theory for the court’s conclusion that a 
very high ratio between punitive dam-
ages and compensatory damages was 
warranted in this case.24 
Polinsky and Shavell conclude that  
The court’s analysis almost certainly 
caused it to significantly overestimate 
the likelihood that State Farm would   
escape liability for unreasonable rejec-
tion of settlement offers — and thus to 
overstate the size of the punitive award 
necessary to deter such behavior.  Its 
judgment, if affirmed, would likely gen-
erate the adverse consequences associ-
ated with excessive damages awards.25 
 Polinsky and Shavell may or may not be right 
when they say that the court’s analysis embodies a 
significant overestimation of the probability that State 
Farm would escape liability for unreasonable rejection 
of settlement offers.  However, their suggestion that 
the punitive damage award in this case is excessive on 
that basis is unwarranted. 
First the internalization approach urged by 
Polinsky and Shavell is entirely inappropriate for a 
case such as this involving an intentional tort carried 
out by force or fraud, or other indisputably reprehen-
sible conduct.  Although Polinsky and Shavell describe 
State Farm’s conduct as evidencing unreasonable, 
                                                 
24 Polinsky and Shavell Br. at 14-15. 
25 Id. at 15. 
 24 
bad-faith claim handling,26 the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld the trial court’s finding that State Farm’s con-
duct was fraudulent.  See p. 30, infra.27  Since fraud is 
a classic form of market-bypassing conduct, deter-
rence theory does not imply a sharp limit on the puni-
tive damage award.  Indeed, Polinsky and Shavell have 
conceded that internalization is inappropriate for a 
case such as this.  In their article on punitive dam-
ages they note that  
[i]f . . . a reprehensible act is purely     
intentional, overdeterrence cannot occur.  
Suppose a surgeon intentionally left a 
surgical tool in the patient . . . .  
Threatening the surgeon with punitive 
damages would further discourage the 
surgeon from intentionally leaving the 
surgical tool in a patient.  
Overdeterrence cannot occur.28 
                                                 
26 Polinsky and Shavell Br. at 3 (case involves “State 
Farm’s unreasonable rejection of an offer by a third-party to settle 
a suit against” Campbell); id. at 6 (“the unreasonable refusal to 
settle third-party claims against its insureds” is “the conduct for 
which the company was found liable in this case”). 
27 Specifically, the Utah Supreme Court held that “State 
Farm repeatedly deceived and cheated its customers” pursuant to 
an official policy of setting “monthly payment caps” on payouts by 
adjusters and “individually reward[ing] those insurance adjusters 
who paid less than the market value for claims,” Pet. App. 18a — 
conduct that it described as “reprehensible.”  Pet App. 20a.  Fur-
ther, the court emphasized that “State Farm’s fraudulent conduct 
has been a consistent way of doing business for the last twenty 
years, directed at some of society’s most vulnerable groups.”  Pet. 
App. 34a.  State Farm’s fraudulent incentive pay policy, the trial 
court held, “has applied equally to the handling of both third-party 
and first-party claims.”  Pet. App. 119a.  In affirming the trial 
court, far from basing its decision on a “bad faith” theory, the Utah 
Supreme Court indicated that it saw no need to address the theory 
because the entirety of the jury’s verdict was sustainable on the 
fraud count.  Pet. App. 60a, 64a. 
28 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 10, at 907 n.120. 
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In addition, the facts of this case suggest that 
the punitive damage award of $145 million may well 
be below the minimum necessary to strip State Farm 
of its gains.  Thus, there is no reasonable basis sug-
gested in the record for rejecting the award as exces-
sive.  Where a defendant has not proffered evidence to 
provide such a basis in the record, a reviewing court 
should not accept its assertions that it has been pun-
ished excessively. 
 
A. The Internalization Approach is Inap-
propriate for a Case Involving Fraud, 
and Under the Appropriate Approach, 
Which Requires Gain-Stripping, the 
Utah Supreme Court’s Conclusion 
Does Not Clearly Result in Excessive 
Punitive Damages or Overdeterrence 
 Perhaps the most important lesson from deter-
rence theory is that the proper measure of damages is 
dependent on the characterization of the offender’s 
conduct.  If the offender’s conduct appears to be a 
type of theft (or more generally, market bypassing), 
then deterrence theory implies that the punitive dam-
age award should aim to eliminate the offender’s   ex-
pectation of gain.  In describing State Farm’s miscon-
duct, the trial court found that it had put in place “an 
unlawful scheme to provide undisclosed incentives to 
adjusters to deny benefits owed consumers by paying 
out less than fair value in order to meet preset,  arbi-
trary payout targets.”  Pet. App. 118a-119a.  It termed 
this misconduct “callous, clandestine, fraudulent, and 
dishonest.”  Pet. App. 136a.  Commenting on “the 
scale of the fraud,” the trial court held that “State 
Farm’s claim-handling practices are predicated on ex-
ploiting the trust placed in it by its policyholders.”  
Pet. App. 138a-139a.  State Farm’s misconduct in this 
case should therefore be completely deterred through 
the imposition of a gain-eliminating damage award.  
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There are no significant overdeterrence costs because 
a high punitive damage award merely encourages in-
surance firms not to adopt claims-processing policies 
that are generally regarded as “predatory,” “inherently 
fraudulent,” and “simply taboo in the insurance in-
dustry.”  Pet. App. 118a.29 
 Further, under the gain-elimination approach, 
the court need not worry about overdeterrence,       
because the whole aim of the punishment is to com-
pletely eradicate the offender’s conduct — to set its  
frequency at zero.  Thus, in order to determine 
whether a punitive damage award satisfies the gain-
elimination standard, two things need to be deter-
mined.  First, what was the offender’s gain?  Second, 
what was the probability of liability?  The minimum 
gain-eliminating penalty is found by dividing the     
offender’s anticipated (or realized) gain by the prob-
ability of liability. 
 If one applies the gain-stripping rule to this 
case, the $145 million punitive verdict cannot be     
regarded as excessive on deterrence grounds, provided 
that the defendant’s conduct is truly fraudulent.  The 
key aim is to make sure that the award is no smaller 
than the minimum necessary to eliminate the possibil-
ity of gain on State Farm’s part.  The primary concern    
under the gain-stripping approach is to avoid under-
deterrence.  
 
                                                 
29 The risk of overdeterrence is even less in a case like this 
where the existence of a company’s “conscious policy of fraudu-
lently denying its customers the benefits of their contracts” is 
proven not by circumstantial evidence of a pattern of activity, but 
“with direct evidence, in the form of internal company documents, 
admissions from a number of former employees, and expert wit-
nesses.”  Pet. App. 137a. 
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B. The Gain-Stripping Principle Does Im-
ply Constraints on the Size of Punitive 
Damage Awards, Although Even Under 
Those Constraints the $145 Million 
Punitive Damage Award is Not Exces-
sive 
 Although the gain-stripping approach does not 
imply a limit on punitive damage awards for fraud, 
theft, and other types of market-bypassing conduct, it 
may still be worthwhile under this approach to try to 
determine the minimum award necessary to eliminate 
the defendant’s gains.  There are two reasons for this.  
First, we should determine the minimum in order to 
make sure that the punitive damage award really does 
exceed the minimum.  Second, if there is any possibil-
ity of error in the court’s characterization of the defen-
dant’s conduct, we should try to determine whether 
there is a risk of serious overdeterrence, which could 
arise only if the court has erroneously characterized 
the defendant’s conduct. 
 There are three approaches one could take to 
determine the minimum gain-stripping penalty in this 
case.  The first is to determine the expected gain from 
each type of intentional misconduct (assuming rele-
vant variations exist), and to divide that sum by the 
probability that the defendant would be held liable for 
that particular variation of misconduct.  The second 
approach is to determine the average gain from the 
defendant’s intentional misconduct and multiply that 
sum by the factor necessary to eliminate the defen-
dant’s average gain.  The third approach is to deter-
mine the total gain from the defendant’s intentional 
misconduct, and to simply use that sum as the esti-
mate of the punitive verdict.  All three of these         
approaches should have the same result in the long 
term — eliminating the offender’s illicit gains. 
 The third approach is easiest to apply here, 
given that State Farm has provided no evidence that 
would require a court to conclude that the punitive 
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damage award in this case exceeds the profits State 
Farm pocketed from its misconduct.  State Farm’s 
fraudulent payout-capping scheme ran from 197930 to 
at least the time of the Campbells’ trial in 1996.  Pet. 
App. 23a.  It was described by the trial court as “ex-
tremely profitable.”  Pet. App. 140a.  If State Farm’s 
scheme netted the firm as little as $10 million per 
year, then its gain would have amounted to at least 
$160 million, ignoring the returns from investing the 
early proceeds.31  The punitive damage award in this 
case is less than this conservative estimate of State 
Farm’s illicit gain. 
 The upshot of this exercise is a general method 
for reviewing the reasonableness of a punitive damage 
award, and a specific conclusion as to the reasonable-
ness of the $145 million punitive damage award in 
this case.  The general method of review suggested 
here would decide the reasonableness of a punitive 
damage award, on deterrence grounds, by asking 
whether a plausible construction of the facts could 
yield the punitive damage award as a minimum gain-
stripping penalty.  If, in light of the facts of the case, 
the punitive damage award appears to be within the 
range of plausible minimum gain-stripping penalties, 
then the punitive damage award should be deemed 
reasonable.32  If the punitive damage award is clearly 
                                                 
30 Pet. App. 132a (describing date of State Farm’s PP&R 
manual). 
31 If we add the returns from investing proceeds from early 
years, then State Farm’s probable gain increases dramatically.  
For example, if State Farm earned six percent per year from     
investing $10 million of illicit gains annually, the total over the 
period 1979 to 1996 would come to about $280 million. 
32 Potential defendants might object to this approach on 
the ground that it could lead to an excessive award — i.e., an 
award that exceeds any realistic estimate of the defendant’s illicit 
gain.  However, defendants always have the option to provide evi-
dence to prove that their gains from an illicit scheme were less 
than a certain amount, in order to cap the punitive award.  For 
example, in this case State Farm could have provided evidence 
that its annual gain from its payout-capping scheme (specifically, 
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above the range of plausible minimum-gain-stripping 
penalties, then a reviewing court should  uphold the 
award only if there is little uncertainty   regarding the 
maliciousness of the defendant’s conduct. 
For example, suppose a defendant, in order to 
gain $100, fires a gun indiscriminately into a crowd of 
people.  Since there is absolutely no uncertainty      
regarding the maliciousness of the defendant’s con-
duct, no court should consider itself bound by law to 
constrain the punitive portion of the judgment to a 
limit of $100.  Since complete deterrence is the proper 
goal, and since there is no uncertainty regarding the 
inherent offensiveness of the defendant’s conduct, a 
court should consider itself free to assess a punitive 
damage award at any level above $100.  On what   ba-
sis would a court ever limit the punitive award in this 
example?  What overdeterrence costs would a court be 
trying to avoid? 
On the other hand, in the business context 
there are cases in which there is uncertainty regarding 
the proper characterization of the defendant’s con-
duct.33  Many such cases are decided by a jury, and 
once a jury has decided that the defendant’s conduct 
is malicious, the matter is settled.  Unless the facts 
are such that no reasonable jury could have found the 
defendant’s conduct malicious, the jury’s determina-
                                                                                                    
the fraudulent parts of it) amounted to a relatively small amount, 
say $1 million.  Over the sixteen-year period of State Farm’s 
wrongdoing, that would mean a total of $16 million in illicit prof-
its, compared with a punitive damage award of $145 million, nine 
times the illicit gain, which State Farm could then have argued 
was excessive.  But see TXO, 509 U.S. at 446, 462 (plurality opin-
ion of Stevens, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ, and Blackmun, J.) 
(upholding punitive damage award of $10 million even on assump-
tion that the expected gain was only $1 million). 
33 For example, in the field of antitrust, a finding of “intent 
to monopolize” is always clouded to some extent by the defen-
dant’s natural desire to maximize profits.  For this reason, com-
mentators and courts have found it difficult to articulate a legal 
test for monopolization that avoids punishing firms for aggressive 
pro-competitive conduct, see Cass & Hylton, supra note 9. 
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tion has to stand.  Still, even in such a case, a review-
ing court may have some lingering doubts as to 
whether the defendant’s conduct should have been 
labeled  malicious.  Under the theory presented here 
the appellate court should have broad authority to re-
view the reasonableness of the trial court’s punitive 
damage award.  The basis on which such a review 
should be conducted is to determine whether the 
award is within or well beyond the range of plausible 
minimum gain-stripping penalties.  If the award is 
well above the range of such penalties, then the re-
viewing court should require the trial court to set the 
award at the minimum gain-stripping level, at least 
where there is legitimate doubt about whether the of-
fender’s conduct is clearly wrong. 
The $145 million punitive award in this case 
appears to be well within the range of reasonable 
awards.  The trial court and the Utah Supreme Court 
concluded that State Farm, as a matter of official cor-
porate policy, pursued for nearly two decades a 
fraudulent incentive scheme to underpay claims, that 
the Campbells were among its many victims, and that 
it remained in effect at the time of trial.  Pet. App. 18a, 
20a, 34a, 118a-121a, 134a-136a, 138a-141a.  There 
is a plausible construction of the underlying facts that 
yields $145 million as the minimum gain-stripping 
penalty.  Indeed, the $145 million punitive damage 
award may well be less than the minimum amount 
necessary to eliminate State Farm’s illicit gains.  Given 
this, there is no basis on deterrence grounds for hold-
ing that the punitive damage award was excessive. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The judgment of the Utah Supreme Court 
should be affirmed. 
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